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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a framework for agents in globally collaborative supply chain by applying the concept of coalition
formation, a cooperation game in game theory. This framework provides mutual benefits to every party involved buyers,
sellers and logistics providers. It provides a common gateway that allows individual parties to locate the right partners,
negotiate with them, and form coalition in the best possible ways. The framework is applicable to real world e-business
models, including B2C, B2B, supply chain and logistics, SME, etc. We firstly discuss common needs existing in today
e-business. We then discuss about our framework, i.e., negotiation protocol and decision mechanism.
Keywords: coalition formation, game theory, negotiation protocol, decision mechanism
1. INTRODUCTION
The current business environment is characterized by
large complex supply chains that are often global in
reach and that are highly adaptive, being frequently
re-configured to respond to dynamic business contexts.
It is widely recognized collaboration across the supply
chain is a key prerequisite for supply chain efficiency.
The effective deployment of information technology
and systems, specially the Internet and the worldwide
web, has made new modes of complex, dynamic yet
effective collaboration possible across supply chains.
Collaboration in supply chains can take various forms.
Suppliers and buyers might collaborate to increase
buying/selling power, to reduce logistics costs or to
aggregate capacity. The problem of determining an
optimal set of collaborative arrangements/agreements
for a given firm can be complex. This research seeks to
develop automated (or semi-automated) negotiation
protocols as a basis for building decision support
functionality for dealing with this complexity.
The coalition formation problem ([4], [9]) considers
techniques and criteria that might be used by a
collection of (rational) agents to decide how they might
group together to improve individual or social utility.
Coalitions are ubiquitous in real-life settings. The
theoretical underpinnings of approaches to coalition
formation lie in the literature on multi-player games in
game theory ([9]). Players negotiate among themselves
about payoffs to decide which coalition to join. In
reality, it is more complex than that. Self-interested
agents, operating in dynamic environment such as
supply chain, are under heterogeneous constraints.
Furthermore, each agent has its own strategies that
increase or decrease the value of each constraint thus
affects the decision making of agents. A simple example
of this is one is using express mail service, which costs
more, due to a deadline while another is using ordinary
mail service, which costs less, with further deadline.
While time is changing in dynamic environment, the

value of a constraint varies thus affecting the utility of
the agent. In contrast to traditional coalition formation
study, where the coalition value is predefined and
thoroughly known among agents, an agent has to
calculate, according to its constraints and strategies, for
the coalition that would give it maximum utility. We
believe that two of the key components of successful
coalition formation of self-interested agents are, one,
quickly negotiating with other agents and, two, selecting
the best possible coalition. Each agent, bounded by its
own constraints, may negotiate with others to form a
coalition, which is likely to yield maximum benefit.
Such a coalition, however, may not be formed due to the
constraints. So the agent has to look for the next best
possible coalition by consulting with its internal utility
mechanism. Negotiation and decision must be done in a
timely fashion. There are works in coalition formation
that discuss the formation of buyers, sellers and LPs
separately. This work provides a basic framework that
allows thorough collaboration among agents in supply
chain. It includes two important components: a
negotiation protocol and a decision mechanism. The
negotiation protocol allows agents to exchange
necessary information before deciding which coalition
to join. A coalition can be as complex as a coalition of
buyers, sellers and LPs. We restrict attention to
traditional supply chain activities for the sake of
simplicity. Our focus is primarily on material flows,
but note that many of the concepts developed in this
work could apply equally well to these other forms of
collaboration.
2. COLLABORATION IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN
As discussed earlier, our focus in this paper is to
develop coalition formation techniques that are
appropriate to large, complex supply chains. In our
domain, we can conceive of three categories of
actors/agents: buyers, sellers and logistics providers
(LPs). In this view, a logistics provider is any
organization that provides transportation, warehousing
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or other logistics-related services. A firm (buyer or
seller) has a set of plans to produce goods. Each plan
consists of multiple activities, which may be of two
types: external and internal. External activities are those
that involve with i) procuring raw materials from
external suppliers and ii) transporting the raw materials
from the suppliers’ warehouses to appropriate
manufacturing sites. Internal activities are those that
deploy internal resources of the firms (e.g., in-house
manufacturing, assembly etc.). These activities are often
required
to
satisfy
synchronization/scheduling
constraints, and there are penalties associated with the
violation of these constraints. In addition to these
constraints, each agent/actor seeks to satisfy several
(internal) objectives, e.g. buying the raw materials at the
affordable prices, with acceptable quality etc. In modern
web-enabled supply chains, the process of matching
buyers with sellers (of goods or services) is often
facilitated by online e-marketplaces. Our framework
assumes the existence of multiple such e-markets, where
sellers advertise their product or service offerings while
buyers advertise their requirements. There are many
different motivating factors that make firms collaborate.
In other words, there are multiple distinct drivers for
coalition formation.
The simplest form of a supply chain coalition is one
where a buyer forms a coalition with a seller and an LP
to satisfy one of the external activities in a plan (e.g. to
supply and deliver a manufacturing input to a
production process). Buyers sometimes form coalitions
with other buyers for the purpose of buy-side
aggregation, i.e., the aggregation of buying power.
Sellers sometimes form coalitions with other sellers to
aggregate selling power. Such coalitions are common
for small sellers, such as in agricultural cooperatives
(e.g. for micro-producers of dairy products). Logistics
provider (LPs) may want to form coalitions to aggregate
their service capacities. We note that we have only
listed the basic drivers. Most real-life supply chain
coalitions tend to have more than one motivating factor
driving their formation. Thus a coalition consisting of
several sellers and several LPs might be driven by the
need to aggregate selling power (for the sellers), the
need to aggregate production capabilities (again for the
sellers) and the need to offer comprehensive production
and delivery contracts (thus bringing in one or more LPs
into the coalition). We also note agents/actors (i.e.,
buyers, sellers or LPs) could participate in more than
one coalition at any given point in time. Thus a seller
might participate in a coalition with other sellers to
aggregate selling power, while simultaneously
participating in a coalition with a different set of sellers
in order aggregate manufacturing capabilities.
Both quantitative and qualitative factors play a role in
coalition formation decisions. Price, delivery cost and
lead time are examples of the former while quality,
satisfaction and trust are examples of the latter. In the
current work, we focus on four key criteria - cost, lead

time, quality and trust - while acknowledging that other
criteria might be relevant (though possibly less
important). Cost is the sum of price and delivery cost.
Lead time is the time elapsed between an order being
placed and the good or service becoming available.
Trust is usually taken to denote the degree of belief of
an actor/agent that another actor/agent will live up to its
commitments. These attributes are not orthogonal, and
most decisions typically involve trade-offs between
them. One may be willing to pay more for a shorter lead
time (or higher quality or higher trust/reliability) and
vice versa. One may, in some settings, be willing to
accept longer lead times for the purpose of getting
higher quality. Several other instances of such trade-off
are common, but we do not list them all here. Although
negotiation can be either bilateral or multilateral, we can
in most instances reduce negotiation to the bilateral case
without loss of generality. The simplest scenario is
where single agents negotiate, e.g., a buyer with a seller
and a buyer with an LP. A buyer can bilaterally
negotiate with multiple sellers/LPs at the same time in
order to find the best pair of a seller and an LP. The
information exchanged is kept private to each agent. A
more complex scenario is where multiple agents
negotiate. An agent that stands to benefit the most from
forming a coalition usually acts as the coalition leader. A
coalition leader negotiates bilaterally with multiple
agents of its own type (buyer, seller or LP) to establish a
sectoral coalition, i.e., a coalition of buyers, or a
coalition of sellers, or LPs etc. The object of such
negotiation is usually to establish how the coalition
value, i.e., the financial benefits of collaboration might
be distributed across the members of the coalition.
3. A FRAMEWORK FOR SUPPLY CHAIN
COALITION FORMATION
In our model, the agents are divided in three
groups— the set B = {B1, B2,… , Bi} of buyers, the set S
= {S1, S2, … , Sj} of sellers, and the set L = {L1, L2,… ,
Lk} of LPs. The set LOC = {loc1, loc2,… , locm} is a set
of locations where sellers’manufacturing facilities or
warehouses and buyers’sites are located. The set G =
{G1, G2,… , Gn} is a set of goods. Each good g is
associated with a load belonging to the set LD = {LD1,
LD2,… , LDo}, where a load is defined by either weight
or volume. The notion of a load as distinct from a good
becomes relevant in the context of negotiation with LPs.
The sets LOC, G and LD are common knowledge to all
agents. We will assume that each agent (whether a
buyer, seller or LP) has access to the following: 1) A
history of the prior coalitions that the agent has
participated in. 2) A history of what has transpired in
the current round of negotiation. 3) An operations
management system. In the instance of buyers and
sellers, these would essentially be some form of
production scheduling and optimization system. For LPs,
these would be some form of logistics optimization
system. The intent is to be able to query the system to
obtain quotes that would be used in the process of
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negotiation. Thus a seller should be able to query the
operations management system by providing the
product requirements and the date/time by which the
product must be ready (typically a shipping deadline) to
obtain a price quote. This quoted price is typically
higher for early shipping deadlines (i.e. rush orders) and
vice versa. Similarly, an LP should be able to query
such a system with details on the loads, origin,
destination and delivery deadlines to obtain a price
quote to use in negotiation. Once again, rush orders are
likely to result in higher price quotes and vice versa. An
operations management system is assumed to have
access to real-time data about the firm’s current
business context, and thus provides highly
context-sensitive output. We do not discuss the design
and implementation of such systems, but note that most
firms (especially larger ones) tend to employ some
version of these systems.
In the following, we present a simple negotiation
protocol to support coalition formation. We first
describe some basic assumptions made by the protocol.
A message containing fields set to null is treated as a
query. An agent replies to a query with an offer made by
filling the null fields of the query with proposed values.
Agents negotiate by modifying the values of the
received offers and sending them back. Agents accept
offers by sending acknowledge messages. When a deal
is done, agents are obliged to discharge their
commitments.
3.1 Buyer to Seller and Buyer to LP Negotiation
Direction

Message

B→S

B2S(msg#,
buyer,
good,
totalquantity,
quality,
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price, expirytime)
S2B(msg#, seller, good, quality, (availabletime, origin,
quantity), price, expirytime)
B2Sack(msg#)
S2Back(msg#)
B2L(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
L2B(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
B2Lack(msg#)
L2Back(msg#)

B←S
B→S
B←S
B→L
B←L
B→L
B←L

Note: B is the buyer, S is the seller and L is the LP.
Table 1: Buyers’negotiation messages with sellers over
buying goods and with LP over delivering goods.

The buyer begins negotiation by sending a message
B2S(msg#, buyer, good, quality, (availabletime, origin,
quantity), price, expirytime) to sellers asking for a quote
for totalquantity units of the good. (availabletime,
origin, quantity) is a list of triples, each of which
specifies that a certain quantity of the good needs to be
picked up from origin at availabletime. If the buyer is
contacting the seller for the first time or wants an
updated quote, availabletime, origin, quantity and price
are set to null (i.e., the buyer does not wish to
pre-specify an available-time, the exact location the
good is to be sourced from, the quantity to be sourced
from that location and the price the seller may wish to

3

offer). In subsequent messages from the buyer to the
seller, the (availabletime, origin, quantity) triples may
have non-null values. This is because the seller would
have replied to the buyer with a similar list of tuples
(see below) indicating that the seller would be able to
meet the order by sourcing production from multiple
locations with distinct available times. The expirytime
provides the seller with a deadline within which it must
reply – otherwise the request will be deemed to have
expired. Upon receiving the message, each seller
consults its operations management system, retrieves
the price quote and available time, then replies to the
buyer with the message S2B(msg#, seller, good, quality,
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price, expirytime),
indicating that the seller will be able to offer the good,
at a specific price, ready at origin on availabletime. The
offer lasts for expirytime (in case the seller is not in a
position to supply the good, it will not reply). If the
buyer is satisfied with the offer, it will send the message
B2Sack(msg#) back to the seller. Once the seller
receives it, the deal is done— the buyer is obliged to pay
money and the seller has to supply the good. If the
buyer is not satisfied with the price, it negotiates on the
price by sending the message B2S(msg#, buyer, good,
quality, (availabletime, origin, quantity), price,
expirytime) with the new price back to the seller again.
If the seller is satisfied with it, it will send the message
S2BAck(msg#) back to buyer in order to seal the deal.
At the same time, the buyer also contacts one or more
LPs to organize shipping of the product. It sends the
message B2L(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin,
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
to LPs. The (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime) is a list of packaging tuples,
each of which specifies that there are quantity of loads
to be picked up from origin at pickuptime and to be
delivered to destination at arrivaltime. For the first
message from a buyer to an LP, or when the buyer seeks
an updated quote, the cost will be set to null. Upon
receiving the message, the LP consults its operations
management system to compute the cost of the delivery
job. It then sends the quote to the buyer with the
message L2B(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin,
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime).
The quote will last for expirytime. If the buyer is
satisfied with the quote, it finalises the deal by sending
the message B2LAck(msg#) back to the LP. If the buyer
seeks to make a counter-offer to an LP, it will set load,
quantity, origin, destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime
and cost to its desired values. It then sends a message
B2L(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) to the LP. If
the LP is happy with it, it will reply with the message
L2BAck(msg#). Both buyer and LP are now contracted.
3.2 Decision Mechanism
At the top level, buyers have to obey a set of criteria in
order to make decisions about their external activities.
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We modify multi-attribute decision making scheme
proposed by Keeney and Raiffa ([7]). Instead of having
a fixed weight attached to each attribute, we propose to
have a dynamic weight table for each attribute. The
dynamic weight table associates a set of weights with a
number of environment conditions in one-to-one
manner. The environment conditions are the facts,
which affect the weight, or importance, of an attribute.
For example, the weight for time and price are equal to
1 in normal situation. In the face of a shortage of a raw
material, the weight of time is 10 times more than that
of the price. The environment conditions can be
achieved from internal or external sources. They can be
in form of relation among attributes and facts. Therefore,
the near optimal is acceptable to experienced agents
who know how to make good profit in the long run.
Strategic weight
Condition
X1
X2
X1
X2

Attribute
a1
a1
a2
a2

Weight
w11
w12
w21
w22

U = ∑ aqwqp Where
condition Xp holds

Buyer’s ranking table
Sellers’offers
(msg1, S1)
(msg2, S1)
(msg3, S2)

LPs’offers
(msg7, L7)
(msg8, L8)
(msg9, L8)

∑ aqwqp
∑ aqS1wqp +∑ aqLywqp
∑ aqS1wqp +∑ aqL8wqp
∑ aqS2wqp +∑ aqL8wqp

When a buyer is dealing with a new agent, it may give a
low value to trust, e.g. 0.3 or 0.4 to the new agent. If the
agent performs well, e.g., keeps up with schedule,
provide high quality of good, etc., the buyer increases
trust value for that agent. On the other hand, if an agent
fails to keep up with its promise, the buyer decreases the
trust value. All the offers made by sellers and LPs are
kept in buyers’knowledge base. Whenever it needs to
compute the utility, it checks for the current
environment condition Xp and take the corresponding
weight wpq of each attribute aq. It creates a new tuple
(msg#, agent) for each active offer and create a new
ranking table composed of three fields: sellers’ offer
(msg#, agent), LPs’offers (msg#, agent) and ∑ aqwqp.
The first two fields are merely reference to the exact
offers. The third field is the utility for each combination
of sellers and LPs offers. The agent computes the utility
for each combination by combining utility of the seller’s
offer and that of the LP’s offer. The utility of an offer
can be achieved by ∑ aqwqp, where aq is the attribute
value retrieved from the corresponding offer, and wpq is
the weight of the attribute aq under condition Xp.
3.3 Buyer to Buyer Negotiation
Direction

Message

Bl→Bm

Bl2Bm(msg#, buyer, good, quality, (availabletime, origin,
quantity), price, expirytime)
Bm2Bl(msg#, buyer, good, quality, (availabletime, origin,
quantity), price, expirytime)
Bl2BmDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
Bm2BlDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
Bl2BmAck(msg#)
Bm2BlAck(msg#)
Bl2BmDelAck(msg#)
Bm2BlDelAck(msg#)

Bl←Bm

Figure 1: Strategic weight table, utility calculation and ranking
for the best combination of seller and LP.

Bl→Bm
Bl←Bm

Each agent maintains the strategic weight table, which
counsels the agent a value of the weight of an attribute
under a certain condition. The weight of an attribute is
in a range of integer numbers. The agent controls values
of the lower and upper bounds. A condition change can
be a stock shortage, a financial concern, a complaint
from customer, or a combination of them. An agent
learns from its experience that how the changing
environment affects its business and how to react. The
results of the reactions will be analysed by the agent and
it will update the range of the weights and their values
under such conditions. It specifies in the table about a
certain condition Xp expressively. Each attribute aq
affected by the condition Xp will be assigned a specific
weight wiq to it. For example, when “there is a stock
shortage of a raw material g”(good g ∈ G), the weight
of the attribute “price” under this condition will be
decreased while the weight of lead time will be
increased. The agent updates its strategic weight table
every time it senses a change in environment. This
allows agent to act wisely in dynamic environment.
Among the four attributes, trust is a special decision
criterion in the sense that it depends on other attributes
such as time and quality promised by other agents.
Agents maintain trust differently. Each buyer has a trust
table keeping record of other agents, including other
buyers, sellers and LPs, and their trusted values. Each
agent in the trust agent is associated with an integer
value from range [-1,1]. The value is updated over times.

Bl→Bm
Bl←Bm
Bl→Bm
Bl←Bm

Note: Bl is the leading buyer, Bm is a member buyer.
Table 2: Buyers’negotiation messages on buying goods.

Buyers can form coalition to share discount on prices
and delivery costs. A buyer can join any appropriate
coalition. A buyer can join a coalition for discount on
price and join another coalition for saving delivery cost.
This allows agents to maximise benefits freely. When a
buyer wants to form a coalition of buyers, it becomes a
leading buyer, who tries to negotiate among buyers to
form a buying coalition then negotiates on behalf of the
coalition to agree on the prices with sellers. Firstly, the
leading agent consults with its knowledge about other
buyers who might be interested. Agents are considered
being interested if i) they used to buy the same good at
around this time previously, ii) they are located nearby,
or iii) randomly selected. The leading agent sends the
message
Bl2Bm(msg#,
buyer,
good,
quality,
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price, expirytime) with
value of origin, quantity and price set to null to all
interested agents. The interested agents consider the
invitation and if they find that they are in need of the
same good of the same quality at availabletime, they
will reply by sending the message Bm2Bl(msg#, buyer,
good, quality, (availabletime, origin, quantity), price,
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expirytime) with the quantity set to an appropriate value
back to the leading buyer. After the expiry time, the
leading buyer assumes that all the truly interested
buyers have responded. It then sums up all the quantitys
and sends the message B2S(msg#, buyer, good, quality,
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price, expirytime) to
sellers. The sellers will reply with the message
S2B(msg#, seller, good, quality, (availabletime, origin,
quantity), price, expirytime).
Upon receiving quotes from sellers, the leading buyer
select the one with maximal utility, computed the same
way discussed above. It then computes the price for
each interested agents. Then the leading agent sends the
message
Bl2Bm(msg#,
buyer,
good,
quality,
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price, expirytime) to
interested agents. If the all interested agents agree, they
send the message Bm2BlAck(msg#) and the coalition is
formed. If any of them is not satisfied with the share,
they may negotiate on the price by sending message
Bm2Bl(msg#, buyer, good, quality, (availabletime,
origin, quantity), price, expirytime). The leading buyer
may try to satisfy the demanding buyers by giving away
its share on the discount (Kraus et al., 2004) up to a
limit. Whenever it goes beyond that, the leading buyer
send the message B2S(msg#, buyer, good, quality,
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price, expirytime)
with the price increased by the excess to the seller. If the
seller accepts it, the leading buyer sends the
Bl2BmAck(msg#) to all members. The buying coalition
is now formed. All members are obliged to pay the bills.
If the seller does not accept, the negotiation goes on,
virtually similar to that between a single buyer to a
single seller. If the time runs out, then all of them suffer
loosing opportunity.
Any buyer can try to manage transportation for other
agents. Those agents may have been already interested
in buying within the same buying coalition or may be
located nearby. The process is similar to forming buying
coalition. The leading buyer sends message
Bl2BmDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin,
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
with load, quantity and cost set to null to all interested
agents. The recipient agents consider if the origin,
destination, pickuptime, and arrivaltime are suitable
with their plans. The interested agents sent message
Bm2BlDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin,
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
with (load, quantity, origin, destination, pickuptime,
arrivaltime) and cost set to appropriate values back to
the leading buyer. The leading buyer collects all replies
and send message B2L(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity,
origin, destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost,
expirytime) with (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime) set to all members’ requests
and cost set to null to LPs. The LPs reply with message
L2B(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) with cost set
to appropriate value. The leading buyer computes for
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the best offer and compute for the cost for each
interested agent. It then sends to interested agents the
message Bl2BmDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin,
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
with cost set to their costs. If all the interested agents are
happy with their costs, they reply with message
Bm2BlDelAck(msg#). The leading buyer sends the
acknowledge message to the LP. The deal is done. If the
interested agents are not satisfied with their costs, they
negotiate with the leading agent by sending message
Bm2BlDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin,
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
with their preferred costs. The leading agent can try to
negotiate with the unhappy buyers by giving away its
share on the saved cost up to a threshold. If the
demanding goes beyond the threshold, the leading buyer
negotiates with the LP. The process repeats backward
and forward until every agent is satisfied or the time
expires.
3.4 Seller to Seller and LP to LP Negotiation
Sellers can form coalition when appropriate. Once a
seller receives a quote it considers out of its resources or
considers outsourcing is beneficial, it negotiates with
other sellers. It firstly consults with its own plan for its
capability and consults with its knowledge base for
outsourcing to other sellers. It computes for other
sellers’ share on goods and prices. It sends message
Sl2Sm(msg#, seller, good, quality, availabletime,
quantity, price, expirytime) with price set to null to
other sellers who can mutually cover the outsourcing.
The recipients reply with the prices-quoted message
Sm2Sl(msg#, seller, good, quality, availabletime,
quantity, price, expirytime). If the leading seller is
satisfied with all quotes, its finalises the deals with other
agents by sending message Sl2SmAck(msg#). If it is not
satisfied with any of them, it can negotiate, similarly to
how the leading buyer does it. Once all of the
unsatisfied agents agree, they accept by sending
message Sm2SlAck(msg#) back to the leader. Then the
deal is done.
Direction

Message

Sl→Sm

Sl2Sm(msg#, seller, good, quality, availabletime, quantity,
price, expirytime)
Sm2Sl(msg#, seller, good, quality, availabletime, quantity,
price, expirytime)
Ll2Lm(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
Lm2Ll(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin, destination,
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime)
Sl2SmAck(msg#)
Sm2SlAck(msg#)
Ll2LmAck(msg#)
Lm2LlAck(msg#)

Sl←Sm
Ll→Lm
Ll←Lm
Sl→Sm
Sl←Sm
Ll→Lm
Ll←Lm

Note: Sl is the leading seller, Sm is a member seller. Ll is
leading LP, Lm is member LP.
Table 3: Sellers’negotiation messages over selling goods and
LPs’negotiation messages over delivery jobs.

When contacted from either a buyer or a seller, an LP
may form coalition with others when it does not have
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enough resources or it finds that forming coalition is
more profitable. The leading LP may divide whole
distribution area into sections and decide to bilaterally
negotiate with LPs, each of which is considered having
enough potential to distribute the good on assigned
section. The leading LP sends message Ll2Lm(msg#, LP,
(load, quantity, origin, destination, pickuptime,
arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) with (load, quantity,
origin, destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime) set to
calculated values to potential agents. Each member
agent tries to accommodate the on-negotiating job with
its own resources and its on-going plans. If the member
is satisfied with the offer, it sends message
Lm2LlAck(msg#) back to the leading LP— the deal is
done. If not, it negotiates with the leading LP similar to
buyers and sellers. Some LPs may not be satisfied with
bilateral negotiation, they may force the leading LP to
manage the multilateral negotiation for the sake of
fairness and efficiency. LP negotiation is concerned
with the cost of doing the job and the profit. The cost is
involved with the route a LP run regularly and the route
for the new job.

buyer to LPs, and LPs to LPs. The decision mechanism
is a modification of Keeney et al.’s ([7]), which allows
agents to adapt its decision to suit with changing
environment. Agents can select appropriate weights for
the environment in order to make suitable decision. The
traditional utility-based decision mechanism seems
inadequate in complex settings in real world. New
approaches, e.g., Markov decision processes, Bayesian
networks, CPNets, are suitable for more complex and
dynamic environment. Under uncertain environment,
agents have to learn from the past and project it to
forecast what will happen in the future. Efficient
utilization of knowledge base should help agents
perform better in dynamic coalition formation. Based on
this framework, we want to develop agents who are able
to evolve strategies in order to enhance cooperation. In
stead of modeling supply chain competitive games, we
want to explore that under changing environment, how
agents can adapt their strategies to cooperate and be
successful at the end.
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Coalition formation is an active research area in
multi-agent systems. Previous work has done some part
of our proposing framework as the followings. Li et al.
([8]) addressed the combinatorial auction in coalition
formation. Buyers submit their requests to the mediator
who will allocate the good from sellers to them.
Goldman et al. ([2]) searched for a strategy where
sellers selected the most profitable deal while buyers
looked for the most satisfiable sellers. Kraus et al. ([6])
proposed a compromise strategy for distributing profits
among sellers in order to form coalition quickly. They
found that agents who are willing to give away their
profits actually earn more. Breban et al. ([1]) addressed
the coalition formation based on trust among agents.
Trust is used as a mechanism to enforce agents to
commit themselves to the jobs as parts of the coalition.
Hyodo et al. ([3]) addressed the optimal coalitions of
buyers and sellers who are located in distributed sites.
They deploy genetic algorithm to search for the optimal
share over the discount. Klusch et al. ([5]) addressed
problems in static coalition formation and proposed an
algorithm for mobile agents to form coalition under
dynamic environment. Agents can form overlapping
coalitions.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We propose a simple framework, which involves
negotiation protocol and decision mechanism. The
negotiation protocol allows thorough communication,
i.e., buyers to buyers, buyers to sellers, sellers to sellers,
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